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Introduction
Despite being regulated under the same federal statute and by the
same federal agency,' electronic mass media and common carriers have
historically taken separate legal and regulatory paths. Mass media law
and common carrier law share some characteristics, but they have gener-
ally evolved as separate substantive areas. Specifically, the first amend-
ment has rarely been an important factor in telephone law.2
However, this separation is becoming less clear. For example, one
of the major issues on the current communications policy agenda is tele-
phone company entry into video distribution.3 This issue currently com-
mands the attention of the telephone, cable television, and broadcasting
industries, sending a strong signal that the "convergence" of electronic
media, much discussed over the years, is now upon us.4 Inevitably, mass
media law and common carrier law will also converge and, at times, are
likely to conflict.
Two issues in the 1980s brought these two lines of electronic com-
munications law together. One was electronic publishing, centering on
the ability of the local telephone exchange carriers to offer public infor-
mation services to their subscribers. A second involved content control
of telephone-delivered information services, a debate that has so far fo-
1. Communications Act, ch. 652, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended 47
U.S.C. §§ 151-155 (1988)).
2. Telephone policy in the United States was developed with little consideration of first
amendment issues. See, e.g., I. DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 100-07 (1983).
Courts have occasionally considered the impact of the disconnection of telephone service on an
individual's free speech rights, but no clear doctrine enunciating a first amendment right to use
the telephone has emerged. See, e.g., United States v. Lampley, 573 F.2d 783 (3d Cir. 1978);
Walker v. Dillard, 523 F.2d 3 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 906 (1975); Radford v. Webb,
446 F. Supp. 608 (W.D.N.C. 1978), aff'd, 596 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1979); Palma v. Powers, 295
F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Goldin v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 23 Cal. 3d 638, 592 P.2d 289,
153 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1979); Sokol v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 65 Cal. 2d 247, 418 P.2d 265, 53
Cal. Rptr. 673 (1966).
3. See Cable TV Consumer Protection Act of 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 2d Sess. 464-512 (1990); Oversight of Cable TV- Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 463-512 (1989) (statements of Kent B. Foster, President, GTE Tel. Opera-
tions, and Dean C. Swanson, President, Standard Tel. Co. and Chairman, U.S. Tel. Ass'n);
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS & INFORMATION ADMIN., VIDEO PROGRAM DISTRIBU-
TION AND CABLE TELEVISION, REP. No. 88-235 (1988); McAvoy, USTA Girds Its Loins for
Fight With Cable Over Telco Entry, BROADCASTING, Dec. 11, 1989, at 35; FCC APP WORK-
ING PAPER, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED BROADBAND NETWORKS, REGU-
LATORY POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, (authored by Robert M. Pepper), 4 FCC
Rcd. 1306, paras. 27, 28 (1988).
4. See generally W. DIZARD, THE COMING INFORMATION AGE (1989); I. DE SOLA
POOL, supra note 2, at 23-54.
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cused on the sexually-explicit audiotex services5 commonly known as
"dial-a-porn."
This Article focuses on the roles of the government and the private
telephone companies in the regulation of audiotex. Dial-a-porn has
raised many intriguing questions about the regulation of offensive con-
tent and has, therefore, generated a good deal of analysis.6 However, it
will be dealt with here primarily as a means for examining the structural
regulation of the telephone medium and the impact of that structure on
the control of content. The debate over structural regulation of tele-
phone information services began in earnest with the electronic publish-
ing issue. Accordingly, it is useful to begin this analysis with a summary
of that debate.
I
Background: The Electronic Publishing Issue
The electronic publishing issue emerged in the wake of the FCC's
Computer II decision of 1980, under which the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company (AT&T) was permitted to provide "enhanced serv-
ices," including information services, under a separate subsidiary.' By
permitting AT&T to enter some competitive markets, Computer II ap-
parently removed some of the restrictions placed on the Bell System
under the 1956 consent decree, which had generally prohibited the com-
pany from entering fields outside of regulated common carrier service.8
5. A mass communication service provided through the telephone network. It supplies
recorded information to those who call a designated number.
6. See generally Note, Aural Sex: Has Congress Gone Too Far by Going All the Way With
Dial-a-Porn? 11 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 493 (1989) (authored by Heidi S. Maretz); Note,
Dial-a-Porn: A Private Affair, 24 TULSA L.J. 239 (1988) (authored by Sean H. McKee); Note,
Constitutional Law-The Regulation of Telephone Pornography, Sable Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 433 (1989) (authored by Robert D. Potter Jr.); Comment,
The Second Circuit and Dial-a-Porn: An Unsuccessful Balance Between Restricting Minors'
Access and Protecting Adults' Rights, Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 55 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 685 (1989) (authored by Leah Murphy); Comment, Drawing the Line on Dirty Dialing:
Constitutional Implications of Dial-a-Porn Regulation, 93 DICK. L. REV. 789 (1989) (authored
by Ellen Marie Torregrossa); Comment, Telephones, Sex, and the First Amendment, 33 UCLA
L. REV. 1221 (1986) (authored by Elizabeth J. Mann); Comment, Does the Supreme Court
Extend the Definition of Obscenity to "I Know It when I Hear It?, " 7 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS
L. REV. 91 (1989).
7. In re Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Second
Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, para. 228 (1980) [hereinafter Computer
II Final Decision], modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 84 F.C.C. 2d 50 (1980), aff'd
and clarified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Further Reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d
512 (1981).
8. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. Jan 24,
1956).
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One result of Computer II was the emergence of the American
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA) as a major player in tele-
communications policy. The newspaper industry was especially con-
cerned about the perceived ability of the telephone companies to compete
in the local advertising market.9 Consequently, ANPA embarked on a
lobbying campaign to promote the "diversity principle," which stated
that companies controlling a monopoly distribution system should not be
permitted to manufacture content in that system."° This issue was de-
bated during several rounds of Congressional hearings on the reform of
telecommunications regulation."1 Although no comprehensive legisla-
tion was enacted, clear signals emerged from Congress in support of the
basic tenets of the diversity principle. 2
One reason for the lack of Congressional action was the 1982 settle-
ment of the AT&T antitrust case." a The Modified Final Judgment in-
cluded a ban on entry into the information services market by the
divested Operating Companies,' 4 which then controlled the local "bottle-
necks."' 5 Judge Greene's decisions on this subject are in line with the
9. See Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1981: Hearings on S.
898 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
543-49 (1981) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 898] (testimony of Robert Marbut, Chairman,
Telecomm. Committee, American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n (ANPA)).
10. Diversity of Information: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications,
Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 112-22 (1981) [hereinafter Diversity Hearings] (statement of Robert Marbut, ANPA);
ANPA Telecommunications Statement of Principle, PRESSTIME, Mar. 1981, at 21.
11. See generally Telecommunications Act of 1982: Hearings on H.R. 5158 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 3 (1982) [hereinafter Hearings on HR. 5158];
Diversity Hearings, supra note 10; Hearings on S. 898, supra note 9, at 518-29; Status of Compe-
tition and Deregulation in the Telecommunications Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 327-37 (1981).
12. Hearings on HR. 5158, supra note 11, at 59; S. REP. No. 170, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
41-42 (1981); H.R. REP. No. 1252, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1980).
13. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983), modified, 714 F. Supp. 1 (1988).
14. Following the practice of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, this
Article will refer to the twenty-two divested Bell System exchange carriers as the "Operating
Companies" and the seven regional holding companies that control them as the "Regional
Companies".
15. American Tel. & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 189-90 (A "bottleneck" occurs where one com-
mon carrier controls the facilities that competitiors require to provide communications or en-
hanced services to their customers. Note, California v. FCC: A Victory for the States, 13
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 233, 245 n.79 (1991)(authored by Ann E. Rendahl) (citing Note,
A Comparative Study of the Regulatory Treatment of Enhanced Services in the United States
and the European Community, 9 N.W. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 415, 416 (1988))). In addition, the
Modified Final Judgment (MFJ) placed a seven-year ban on entry by AT&T into information
services, despite the fact that the post-divestiture company would no longer control local ex-
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ANPA position, justifying the ban on a combination of economic and
first amendment grounds.1 6
The electronic publishing issue is essentially one of structural regu-
lation, as opposed to an attempt to regulate specific content. The dial-a-
porn issue, on the other hand, is clearly a matter of content regulation.
However, further examination reveals the makings of an important de-
bate over the structure of the telephone system as it converges with the
realm of mass media. While controversies over specific types of content
will undoubtedly persist, 17 serious questions are also unfolding around
the issue of who will have the authority to make those kinds of decisions.
Telephony, the control of audiotex content, involves a complex in-
teraction of constitutional law, federal and state common carrier regula-
tion, and the actions of private companies. In attempting to understand
the ways in which first amendment principles are beginning to be applied
to the telephone, it is necessary to consider the impact of these various
sources on content regulation.
II
Role of the Federal Government
A. Audiotex as a Telephone Service
Audiotex services, have been an innocuous staple of telephone ser-
vice for many years. Prior to the 1980s, audiotex consisted primarily of
time and weather lines, supplemented by the occasional dial-a-prayer or
dial-a-joke. Time and temperature services were often offered by the tele-
phone company itself as a public service. II
By the early 1980s, these dowdy offerings were joined by newer reve-
nue-generating services. Local exchanges began designating specific ex-
changes (usually 976) for mass announcement services and began offering
lines devoted to sports scores, racing results, stock prices, and astrologi-
cal forecasts.' 9 Prior to divestiture, some of these lines were program-
med by the exchange operators themselves, while others were operated
changes. This ban was allowed to expire in 1989. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,673 (1989).
16. American Tel, & Tel., 552 F. Supp. at 180-86; United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673
F. Supp. 525, 585-92 (D.N.C. 1987), modified, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (The district
court's decision concerning the provision of information services by the Regional Companies
subject to the MFJ was affirmed in part and reversed in part).
17. Members of Congress have expressed concern about various practices of the audiotex
industry, including overcharging and fraudulent contests. Mason, Congress Inspects 900 In-
dustry, TELEPHONY, Oct. 1, 1990, at 9.
18. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1988-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,940 (D.D.C. 1988).
19. Carlin Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 749 F.2d 113, 115 (2d Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Carlin I].
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by third parties. Concurrently, AT&T began offering long-distance audi-
otex service on its 900 numbers.20
Controversy over dial-a-porn originated in New York, where the
New York Telephone Company held a lottery for available audiotex
lines.21 Carlin Communications, a company owned by adult magazine
publisher Gloria Leonard, "won" one of these lines. Carlin used this 976
line to offer a service in which women attempted to titillate callers with
sexually-explicit fantasies. Callers were billed for each call, with the lo-
cal exchange and the message provider sharing the revenue.22 Leonard's
High Society and similar magazines heavily promoted the service, and
Carlin was soon receiving over 100,000 calls daily.23 Carlin and other
companies established similar services in other cities, and dial-a-porn
quickly became a multimillion dollar business.24
Dial-a-porn's popularity inevitably led to controversy, as reports of
children reaching the services spread. The first attempt to restrict dial-a-
porn occurred in 1983, when the County Executive for Suffolk County,
New York petitioned the FCC to terminate Carlin's service as a violation
of a provision of the Communications Act prohibiting "any comment,
request, suggestion or proposal which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent."2 The FCC dismissed this complaint on the grounds that
the statute applied only to those who use obscene or indecent words dur-
ing calls they place.26
In December 1983, section 223 of the Communications Act was re-
vised to apply to recorded messages. At the same time, Congress estab-
lished limitations on the ability of the federal government to prosecute
message providers. Section 223 provides, in part,
(1) Whoever knowingly-
(A) ... by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device)
any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to
any person under eighteen years of age or to any other person without
that person's consent, regardless of whether the maker of such commu-
nication placed the call ... shall be fined not more than $50,000 or
imprisoned not more than six months, or both.
20. Id.
21. Brown & Rohmann, For a Good Time, Call . FORBES, Mar. 28, 1983, at 46.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 78 (1986); 134 CONG. REC. E270-71 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Dannemeyer).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1984 Supp.).
26. In re Application for Review of Complaint Filed by Peter F. Cohalan, FCC File No.
E-83-14, Memorandum Opinions and Orders (adopted May 13, 1983 and Mar. 5, 1984) cited in
Carlin I, supra note 19, at 115 n.5.
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(2) It is a defense to a prosecution under this subsection that the de-
fendant restricted access to the prohibited communication to persons
eighteen years of age or older in accordance with procedures which the
Commission shall prescribe by regulation.
27
Congress attempted to conform to Supreme Court rulings that al-
lowed differential treatment of adults and minors in the regulation of
pornography,2" while concurrently warning that material available to
adults must not be reduced to a level appropriate for children.2 9 The law
concerning restrictions on access by minors to explicit communication
developed from cases involving printed material and theaters. In these
instances, it was feasible for businesses to enact screening mechanisms to
restrict access by minors. Audiotex's ease of accessibility by children
was problematic, however, and led to the public's demand for action.
B. The Broadcasting Analogy: Pacifica Foundation
In light of the easy accessibility of telephones, it is not surprising
that comparisons were made with broadcasting. Several years earlier, in
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,30 the FCC had been successful in taking ac-
tion against a broadcast licensee:for content that fell short of the legal
definition of obscenity. The Commission crafted a definition of inde-
cency to be applied to offensive, but not obscene, sexual material. Inde-
cent material was defined as "language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at times of
the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the
audience."'"
The FCC found its authority for such a policy in 18 U.S.C. § 1463,
which prohibits the utterance of "obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage" over the airwaves.3 2 Since this phrase was written in the disjunc-
tive, the Commission reasoned that obscenity and indecency could refer
to separate classes of material. In the landmark Pacifica decision, the
27. Federal Communications Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-214, 97 Stat.
1467 (1983) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 156, 316, 396.).
28. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629
(1968).
29. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957). Representative Kastenmeier, who proposed
the language of subsection (2), referred to this concern in his remarks on the House floor:
Congress intends that the FCC promulgate reasonable time, place, and manner re-
strictions calculated to restrict access to prohibited communications by persons
under 18 years of age.... [W]e have carefully constructed section 223, as amended,
to avoid reducing the adult population to hearing only what is fit for a child.
129 CONG. REC. E5966-67 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1983) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier).
30. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, para. 11 (1975), aff'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988).
19911
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
Supreme Court upheld the Commission's action, acknowledging that the
unique accessibility of the medium allowed the government to impose
restrictions on the broadcast of indecent content, despite the fact that
such content generally enjoyed constitutional protection. 3
Due to the apparent similarities between the dial-a-porn and broad-
cast indecency issues, Pacifica became a focal point in the efforts of the
federal government to curb objectionable audiotex communication. In
fact, the words "lewd," "lascivious," and "filthy" were removed from the
legislation in order to focus attention on the terms "obscene" and "inde-
cent," which had been defined and accepted in legal precedent. Accord-
ing to Representative Bliley, the sponsor of the Communications Act
revisions, "it is not necessary to keep the litany of terms as currently in
the statute to prohibit that kind of material. It was necessary, however,
to maintain the term 'indecent' since the Supreme Court upheld the
FCC's assessment of a fine based on indecent material in the Pacifica
case."
34
C. Challenges to Audiotex Legislation: The Carlin Cases
The original tests of the 1983 statute, in Carlin I " and Carlin II,6
centered on the FCC's attempts to establish defenses to prosecution as
mandated by Congress.37 Since the court found fault with the Commis-
sion's specific policies in each case, the constitutional issue of indecency
regulation in telephony was not reached. In .Carlin III, however, the
court generally upheld the FCC's reliance on credit cards and scrambling
devices as acceptable methods of restricting access by minors.3" The
court then turned its attention to the first amendment question.
The court noted that the Pacifica opinion emphasized the narrow-
ness of its own holding.3 9 The broadcast in question was judged not only
on its content, but on its context, including such factors as the nature of
the program, the time of the day, and the probable composition of the
audience.' °
33. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748-50.
34. 129 CONG. REC. H10559 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1983) (statement of Rep. Bliley).
35. Carlin I, 749 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1984).
36. Carlin Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Carlin I1].
37. In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against the use of Common Carriers for the Trans-
poration of Obscene Materials, Report and Order, 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996 (1984) (codified at 47
C.F.R. § 64.201); amended, Second Report and Order, 50 Fed. Reg. 42,690 (1985); amended
Third Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2714 (1987).
38. Carlin Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546 (2d Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Carlin III]; see
also Third Report and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 2714, paras. 38-40 (1987).
39. Carlin III, supra note 38, at 558-60.
40. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
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More significantly, the Supreme Court in Pacifica considered the na-
ture of the broadcast medium itself. Broadcasting was found to have "a
unique, pervasive presence" and to be "uniquely accessible to chil-
dren."41 Supporters of the dial-a-porn legislation were hopeful that a
similar analysis would be applied to the telephone medium. However,
subsequent decisions involving mail 2 and cable television43 stressed the
uniqueness of broadcasting and confined the Pacifica rationale to that
medium.
Following these decisions, the Second Circuit in Carlin III con-
cluded that Pacifica "does not justify the regulation of indecent telephone
messages."'  As a result, the words "or indecent" in section
223(b)(1)(A) were struck down as unconstitutional, while the remainder
of the statute was permitted to stand.45
D. Obscenity Bans vs. FCC Guidelines
Technically, Carlin III upholds the federal regulation of dial-a-
porn.46 However, the court's removal of the word "indecent" from the
statute creates an unusual situation. Since obscenity falls outside first
amendment protection,47 total bans on such material are theoretically
permissible. In the wake of Carlin III, defenses to prosecution were in
place for those who followed the FCC guidelines for restricting access to
audiotex services, even those containing content judged to be legally ob-
scene. This was hardly what the supporters of the 1983 legislation had in
mind.48
This "loophole" was duly noted by Representative Bliley as he con-
tinued his efforts to curb dial-a-porn. 49 Even before the Carlin III deci-
41. Id. at 748-49.
42. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 72-74 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1986); Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d
1415 (11th Cir. 1985); Community TV v. Roy City, 555 F. Supp. 1164 (D. Utah 1983).
44. Carlin III, supra note 38, at 560.
45. Id. at 560-61.
46. Id. at 555-57.
47. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
48. The FCC was not completely handcuffed by Carlin III. In March 1988, the Commis-
sion assessed forfeitures of $600,000 each against two dial-a-porn providers. In each case, the
FCC found that the material was obscene and that no precautions to restrict access by minors
had been employed. Intercambio, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 3 FCC Rcd. 7247 (1988);
Audio Enterprises, Inc., Notice of Apparent Liability, 3 FCC Red. 7233 (1988). After Carlin
III, each of these factors apparently had to be present for the FCC to constitutionally restrict
dial-a-porn. The size of the forfeitures, especially as applied to small companies, raised the
possibility that the Commission was using this opportunity to send a message to other provid-
ers whose material might border on the legally obscene.
49. E.g., 134 CONG. REC. H1691-1701 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (statements of Rep.
Bliley).
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sion was handed down, Congress was considering a removal of the
distinction between communication received by minors and adults, sub-
stituting instead a flat ban on dial-a-porn. According to Representative
Bliley, the 1983 amendment had mistakenly legalized some obscene and
indecent communication by instituting the defenses to prosecution.50
Representative Bliley continued to rely on Pacifica, stating that the
"[t]elephone is like radio and television because it is easily accessible to
children and it is almost impossible for parents to monitor its use.'"
Following this reasoning, Representative Bliley contended that Congress
could constitutionally restrict indecent telephone communication.52
E. Restricting Indecent Speech
The problem with relying on Pacifica to support a ban on telephone
indecency is two-fold. First, restrictions on indecency have not been up-
held in any medium but broadcasting. While the principles of Pacifica
could reasonably be applied to telephony, Bolger and Cruz indicated a
reluctance on the part of the courts to extend that rationale to other
media." Second, Pacifica itself did not involve a flat ban on broadcast
indecency. In fact, the Court was explicit on this point. "We have not
decided that an occasional expletive ... would justify any sanction or,
indeed, that this broadcast would justify a criminal prosecution. The
Commission's decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under
which context is all-important. The concept requires consideration of a
host of variables.",54
Pacifica held that, even in the broadcast medium, indecency could
be restricted only under carefully considered circumstances. Even then,
this class of material could not be banned, but instead could be channeled
to times of the day when children were less likely to be in the audience.55
This holding stands in contrast to the attempts of Congress to outlaw all
indecent communication on the telephone system.
In the wake of Carlin III, however, Congress passed a flat ban on
obscene and indecent telephone communication. Section 223(b) read
(1) Whoever knowingly
(A) in the District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communica-
tion, by means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording device)
any obscene or indecent communication for commercial purposes to
50. Telephone Decency Act o/'1987: Hearings on H.R. 1786 Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2-15 (1987) [hereinafter Decency Hearings] (statement of Rep. Bliley).
51. Id. at 13..
52. Id. at 13-15.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
54. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978).
55. Id.
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any person... shall be fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned not
more than six months, or both.
56
No distinctions were made between messages received by minors and
adults and, consequently, no defenses to prosecution were established.
The passage of such constitutionally suspect legislation probably re-
flected a combination of frustration over the Carlin decisions and the
realities of election year politics. In any case, preliminary injunctions
against enforcement of the statute were quickly granted by two district
courts. 7 In Sable, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of
the ban."8 The Court's decision dealt separately with obscenity and inde-
cency. Since obscenity was unprotected by the first amendment, the
Court found no fault with the statute as applied to such material.5 9
The Court also acknowledged that nonobscene material could be
shielded from minors, and that such efforts should include the channel-
ing of indecent broadcasting.' However, this legislation went beyond
these bounds by instituting a total ban on nonobscene material. The
Court unanimously concluded that "the statute's denial of adult access to
telephone messages which are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that
which is necessary to limit the access of minors to such messages., 61
The long-term impact of Sable and the Carlin cases is difficult to
assess. On one hand, the cases appear to restrain the federal government
in its efforts to regulate the content of public telephone communication.
On the other, the Supreme Court may have left the door open for federal
regulation of dial-a-porn by noting that "[t]he government may, how-
ever, regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to
further the articulated interests. "62
Accordingly, Congress revised section 223, continuing the flat ban
on obscene audiotex and authorizing the FCC to adopt rules' restricting
access by minors to indecent material.6 a In June 1990, the Commission
adopted yet another set of dial-a-porn rules.6M These new guidelines, sim-
56. Augustus F. Hawkins-Robert T. Stafford Elementary and Secondary School Improve-
ment Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-297, 102 Stat. 424 (1988).
57. Sable Comm. v. FCC, 692 F. Supp. 1208 (C.D. Cal. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 2829
(1989); Roe v. Meese, 689 F. Supp. 344 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
58. Sable Comm. v. FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829 (1989).
59. Id. at 2835.
60. Id. at 2836-37.
61. Id. at 2839.
62. Id. at 2836 (emphasis added).
63. Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and Related
Agencies Appropriation Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-166, 103 Stat. 1159, 1192-94 (1989).
64. Regulations Concerning Indecent Communications by Telephone, Report and Order,
5 FCC Red. 4926 (1990).
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ilar to those enacted in Carlin III, establish a defense to prosecution for
those indecent audiotex content providers who require payment by credit
card, require a user identification code, or scramble the message. 6,
The federal legislative actions, largely unsuccessful to date, raise a
number of questions concerning the ways in which the first amendment is
to be applied to the telephony medium. Congress chose to assume that,
for purposes of indecency regulation, telephony could be compared to
broadcasting. The Second Circuit chose instead to compare it to cable,
applying standards developed for that medium.66 Eventually, the tele-
phone must come to be recognized as a unique form of mass communica-
tion. The first amendment model for telephony cannot be adequately
borrowed from another medium. Instead, policymakers would be well
advised to consider the technology, functions, and regulatory traditions
of the telephone in attempting to craft regulations.
Guidance in this regard might be found from the history of broad-
cast regulation. A host of policies, ranging from licensing to ownership
rules to content regulation, have been enacted and upheld on the basis of
the unique characteristics of broadcasting, rather than on characteristics
"borrowed" from other media.67 The system of broadcast regulation in
place today exists because government and industry alike recognized in
the 1920s that this new medium would require a fresh regulatory
approach.68
As telephony becomes a mass medium, it seems just as apparent that
first amendment applications must take into account the uniqueness of
the telephone. This is especially true in light of the fact that telephony
has long been a regulated industry and, therefore, has its own regulatory
traditions. Any meaningful attempt to craft policy for telephonic mass
communication should consider these traditions, along with the technical
and functional characteristics of the medium.
III
The Role of State Government
One key difference between telephony and the traditional mass me-
dia is that the telephone system is closely regulated at the state level.
65. Id. at 4928-31.
66. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
67. E.g., Metro Brdcst., Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990); FCC v. National Citizens
Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Na-
tional Brdcst. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Red Lion Brdcst. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367 (1969).
68. E.g., National Brdcst. Co., 319 U.S. at 213-17; G. ARCHER, HISTORY OF RADIO To
1926, at 248-371 (1938); I. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 2, at 112-19; W. EMERY, BROADCAST-
ING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REGULATIONS 10-20 (1961).
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Audiotex services provided by local exchange carriers originate as intra-
state communication and, as such, are subject to regulation by state legis-
latures and utility commissions.
A. State Regulation of Audiotex
The audiotex content controversy has prompted several states to at-
tempt to regulate audiotex services. In many ways, these efforts have
involved arguments similar to those present at the federal level. For ex-
ample, Pennsylvania enacted a statute that placed several restrictions on
providers of sexually explicit audiotex messages.69 Under the statute, all
audiotex messages were required to include a preamble informing the
listener of the cost of the call and, if appropriate, warning the caller that
the message is sexually explicit.7' Furthermore, sexually explicit
messages were available only to those adults who had obtained a nine-
digit access code through a written application process.7
In Fabulous Associates, two providers of adult services challenged
the statute in federal district court. 72 Despite the fact that the statute
was passed after Carlin III, the state relied on Pacifica, arguing that this
was simply an attempt to channel nonobscene offensive material away
from children. 73 The court disagreed with the state and affirmed that
Pacifica was to be applied only to the broadcast medium.74 The decision
followed the Carlin cases by reasoning that the statute placed undue re-
strictions on the ability of adults to receive legally-protected material. 7-
The court also concluded that the statute did not represent the least
restrictive alternative. In addition to describing the obstacles placed be-
tween providers and the adult audience, the court noted a pending action
at the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission (PUC) as an example of
a more acceptable approach.76 Under that proposal, audiotex services
would be provided on two separate exchanges, 976 and 556. 7 7 The tele-
phone company would be permitted to define the types of services, pre-
sumably including adult messages, that would be placed on the 556
69. Telephone Message Services Act, Act No. 1988-27, 1988 Pa. Legis. Serv. 202 (Pur-
don) (codified at 66 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2905 (1988)).
70. 66 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2905(a) (1988).
71. Id. § 2905(b).
72. Fabulous Assocs. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 693 F. Supp. 332 (E.D. Pa.
1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990).
73. 693 F. Supp. at 336.
74. Id. at 337.
75. Id. at 337-38.
76. Id. at 339.
77. Petition of the Bell Tel. Co. of Pa. for Permission to File a Revision to Its Information
Delivery Service Tariff (976 Audiotex), 1988 Pa. PUC LEXIS 402, 1 (May 26, 1988) (LEXIS,
PA Library, PAPUC file).
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exchanges. Subscribers would be able to choose, without additional
charges, whether or not they would have access to this exchange.78
While not ruling on this type of scheme, the court in Fabulous Asso-
ciates cited the PUC's approach as a less restrictive regulatory approach
than that taken by the Pennsylvania legislature. 79 Consequently, the ad-
ministrative proposal served as further evidence of the statute's
overbreadth.80
B. States Balance Competing Interests
The PUC's approach is similar to that adopted in other states.81
While these regulations have yet to be fully tested in the courts, they offer
examples of efforts to balance the competing interests in the dial-a-porn
controversy. More importantly, perhaps, these actions suggest that the
states may ultimately play a larger role than the federal government in
the regulation of telephone content.
The state role covers several dimensions. One of the most intriguing
of these dimensions is the protection accorded freedom of expression
under state constitutions. The first amendment of the United States
Constitution is written in negative terms, prohibiting the government
from "abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. ' ' 82 Most state
constitutions also have some provision pertaining to free speech or press,
but many of these provisions define the right in an affirmative way. 83 In
a 1980 case involving an interpretation of the California Constitution, the
United States Supreme Court acknowledged that state guarantees of free
expression may actually grant more expansive rights of free expression
than the federal Constitution. 4
This circumstance has affected at least one case involving audiotex.
An Arizona statute required message providers to restrict access to those
customers who had presubscribed to the service and to pay for the costs
78. Id. at 6-7.
79. Fabulous Assocs., 693 F. Supp. at 339, aff'd, 896 F.2d 780 (3d Cir. 1990).
80. The Third Circuit delayed its decision pending the resolution of Sable v. FCC, then
upheld the District Court's decision. While finding the specific statute to be overbroad, the
court did not "express any opinion as to the validity of other potential legislation designed to
achieve the same end." Fabulous Assocs., 896 F.2d at 789.
81. E.g., In re Application of Pacific Bell for Auth. to Establish a Tariff Schedule for
Information Calling Servs., 31 C.P.U.C.2d 401 (1989); In re Complaint of Sapphire Comm., 79
Md. P.S.C. 353, 1988 Md. PSC LEXIS 125 (LEXIS, MD library, MDPUC file) (1988); Burk-
hart,'976'Audiotex Service: Lost Innocence, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar. 3, 1988, at 48; Block that
Call. Regulators Back 976 Restrictions, TELEPHONY, Mar. 23, 1987, at 30 [hereinafter Block
That Call].
82. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
83. Thirty-eight such provisions are cited in Salzman, Prune Yard's Progeny: State-Created
Free Speech Access to Quasi-Public Property, 1984 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 121, 129 n.58 (1984).
84. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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of blocking audiotex services to nonsubscribers s5 In challenging the
statute, audiotex providers argued that the restrictions violated both
their rights under the United States Constitution and their even broader
rights under the Arizona Constitution. According to the Arizona
Supreme Court,
The words of art[icle] 2, [section] 6 of the Arizona Constitution ...
directly grant every Arizonan a broad free speech right: "Every per-
son may freely speak, write, and publish on all subjects, being responsi-
ble for the abuse of that right." Thus, the providers argue[d], Arizona
citizens have greater free speech rights than the United States Consti-
tution requires.
8 6
Consequently, the case was decided under the state constitution and
the statute was struck down. While a similar result might well have fol-
lowed under the United States Constitution, it is significant that differ-
ences in state constitutions could lead to different results as state statutes
and state utility commission policies are reviewed.
Similarly, differences in common carrier law occur from state to
state. In another case originating in Arizona, Mountain Bell's policy of
denying access to adult message providers was upheld, in part, on the
ground that state law allowed common carriers to make distinctions
among customers "based on reasonable business classifications." 7
Although this case is more important for its holding on the distinction
between private action and state action,8 8 it points out another aspect of
state law that can be a factor in the regulation of telephonic mass
communication.
Perhaps the most important factor in state regulation concerns the
interaction between state regulators and private companies. Local ex-
change carriers must routinely file tariffs for new services or fees and are
regulated by the utility commissions in many phases of their businesses.
As a result, it is often difficult to determine the extent to which the serv-
ices of a utility derive from the actions of the state or from the business
decisions of a private company. This is a critical issue in light of the
traditional role of the telephone companies as content-neutral common
carriers.
85. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Arizona Corp. Comm., 3 FCC Rulemaking Rep.
(CCH) 26,203, 26,170 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. 1989).
86. Id. 26,171.
87. Carlin Comm. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir.
1987).
88. See infra text accompanying notes 109-11.
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IV
The Role of the Telephone Companies
On the surface, the audiotex business has been a good one for the
telephone industry. The "900" services of long distance carriers, for ex-
ample, were projected to generate over five hundred million dollars in
1990.89 Independent programmers provide both the content and the pro-
motion, while the telephone carriers share generously in the revenue.90
Dial-a-porn, while only one type of audiotex service, has generated large
amounts of revenue for several telephone companies. 91
Yet this new.line of business has had its downside. The political
controversies surrounding dial-a-porn have led to public relations
problems for the telephone industry. For example, an Arizona regulator
compared Mountain Bell to "'a frontier madam, earning a percentage of
every trick the sex vendor turns.' "92
A. Risks & Liabilities of Dial-a-Porn Service
A number of companies have spoken out against dial-a-porn. US
West, Mountain Bell's parent company, acknowledged that dial-a-porn
services were damaging the company's reputation "'because consumers
think of them as a Mountain Bell product.' ,9 A Pacific Bell official
referred to dial-a-porn as "filth," 94 while AT&T executives expressed
concern about the ability of children to gain access to sexual messages on
its 900 lines.95
Acting on these assertions has at times proven to be a more difficult
matter. Prior to 1987, the telephone industry generally took the position
that its obligations as a common carrier prevented it from taking action
against audiotex providers on the basis of content. Robert Helgesen, rep-
resenting NYNEX, presented the views of the telephone industry in his
testimony before the House Telecommunications Subcommittee in
1987.96 NYNEX officially found dial-a-porn to be "repugnant" and sup-
89. Stroud, Popular Number, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Aug. 5, 1990, at Cl, col. 2.
90. See Carlin I, supra note 19, at 115; Wilke, A 'Dream' Business That's Just a Phone
Call Away, Bus. WK., Mar. 31, 1986, at 70.
91. 1 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON
PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 78 (1986); 134 CONG.'REC. E270-71 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1988)
(statement of Rep. Dannemeyer); Brown & Rohman, supra note 21.
92. Mason & Wilson, A T&T Ready to Crack Down on Dial-a-Porn, TELEPHONY, Jan. 4,
1988, at 3.
93. Lannon, Mt. Bell Purges Arizona Phone Lines, TELEPHONY,. Dec. 28, 1987, at 10
(quoting spokesperson Pat Evers).
94. Wilson, Lawsuit Focuses on Dial-a-Porn Controversy, TELEPHONY, Dec. 14, 1987, at 3.
95. Mason & Wilson, supra note 92.
96. Decency Hearings, supra note 50, at 56.
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ported the efforts of Congress to restrict it.97 At the same time, however,
Helgesen expressed his concern over the proper role of the telephone
companies. NYNEX contended that it should not be expected to act as a
censor, nor should it be required to determine which messages were por-
nographic. Instead, the company supported efforts by the government to
make such decisions and expressed its willingness to comply with these
decisions by withholding its transmission services when so directed. 98
NYNEX's concerns appeared to focus on the question of legal liabil-
ity. Under existing common carrier statutes, the company was generally
prohibited from discrimination in the provision of telephone services. If
NYNEX denied service on the basis of its own judgment of the content,
it would bear the responsibility of proving that the content was illegal. 99
This concern was supported by Diane Killory, general counsel for
the FCC. In a written response to the subcommittee, Killory stated,
[A] common carrier must accept customers on a non-content oriented
basis. The Commission has held, however, that this obligation does
not apply where the common carrier has knowledge that its facilities
are being used for unlawful purposes. In such a case, the carrier may
refuse to carry a message if it believes that the message is being pro-
vided in violation of the law.
It should be noted, however, that carriers refuse service at their
own risk. If the carrier incorrectly determines that provision of the
message was unlawful, it could be subject to liability for failure to
carry it.
In view of the difficulties faced by Congress and the Commission in en-
acting constitutional dial-a-porn restrictions, it is hardly surprising that
the telephone industry was less than confident that its own attempts to
regulate content would pass judicial review.
While Helgesen concentrated his testimony on the specific issue of
legal liability, his concerns raised broader questions about the role of the
carriers in providing mass communication services. By attempting to
separate itself from content judgments, NYNEX remained true to the
common carrier tradition. However, the company was also professing a
view of its role that stood in sharp contrast to that of the traditional mass
media provider.
Much of mass communication law rests on the recognition that me-
dia operators edit the material they disseminate. 10 It is interesting that
97. Id.
98. Id. at 56, 62.
99. Id. at 56-57.
100. Id. at 252-53 (citation omitted).
101. Eg., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Columbia Brdcst. Sys. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
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the dial-a-porn debate was unfolding at the same time that the Regional
Companies were actively seeking repeal of the provisions of the divesti-
ture consent decree that prohibited the companies from providing infor-
mation services.1 2 Had those restrictions been removed, some of the
Regional Companies would have surely entered the information services
market and, therefore, would have become "publishers." In Congres-
sional testimony on the electronic publishing issue, AT&T representa-
tives had sought the right to originate content over AT&T's own
transmission lines, comparing their right to do so to that of a newspa-
per.103 Yet, in a different arena, the telephone industry notably declined
to assert the editorial rights normally associated with the publishing field.
In fact, the editorial rights argument was hardly evident in the audi-
otex content debate. By appearing to support dial-a-porn, the telephone
industry surely would have put itself on the wrong side of public opinion.
The electronic publishing issue had been debated in more general terms
and, as such, could be approached as a matter of broad first amendment
principle. Audiotex, in contrast, was strongly associated in the public
mind with sexually-explicit services.
This association has had a significant impact on the early develop-
ment of first amendment law for telephony, as so many of the early cases
and actions have been centered specifically on this unpopular form of
communication. The local exchange operators, facing a new competitive
environment and waging political battles on many fronts, were hardly
eager to take unpopular public positions that would appear to condone
dial-a-porn.
In addition to their concerns over public opinion, the telephone
companies were certainly influenced by the uncertain state of common
carrier law. AT&T's strong first amendment position in the early 1980s
was adopted as part of a campaign to influence Congress in the formula-
tion of policy. In effect, AT&T had nothing to lose by taking such a
position. However, the Regional Companies, after divestiture, were still
obligated to act as common carriers and were generally precluded from a
role in the origination or selection of content. Helgesen's concern over
legal liability was, therefore, a very real factor.
B. The Carlin Cases: Private Action and Enhanced Services
In 1986 and 1987, decisions handed down in two circuit courts cast
new light on the rights of local exchange carriers to deny access to infor-
102. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
103. See Diversity Hearings, supra note 9, at 103-05, 107-08 (testimony of Newton Minow
for AT&T); Hearings on H.R. 5158, supra note 10, at 27-29 (testimony of Newton Minow for
AT&T).
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mation providers. In each of these cases, the specific service in question
was allegedly pornographic. Significantly, however, neither court based
its decision on the sexual nature of the content.
Carlin Communications v. Southern Bell involved a company policy,
approved by the Florida Public Service Commission, excluding from its
audiotex service any message that "'implicitly or explicitly invites, de-
scribes, simulates, excites, arouses, or otherwise refers to sexual con-
duct.' ,,0 Carlin, the same New York-based provider that was then
appealing the FCC actions,15 challenged this policy as a "prior restraint
of free speech without constitutionally required procedural
safeguards.' 06
Since the first and fourteenth amendments only prevent abridgement
of constitutional rights by the government,' 0 7 and not private persons or
entities, the key issue in this case was the extent to which the denial of
access was state action. The Eleventh Circuit relied on Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison, 0 s in which the Supreme Court held that the approval of
a company policy by the regulatory agency does not, by itself, constitute
state action.
Similarly, in Carlin Communications v. Mountain States, Carlin
challenged a policy under which the telephone company refused to offer
its dial-it service to providers of "adult entertainment" messages." The
Ninth Circuit determined that the policy was voluntarily enacted by
Mountain States and, therefore, a private action. The court noted its
agreement with the reasoning of the Eleventh Circuit in Southern Bell
and allowed the policy to stand."'
The first amendment was found to be inapplicable to these private
actions; the question then became whether the denial of access was ac-
ceptable under common carrier law. In holding that the private com-
pany could exercise such discretion, both circuit courts relied primarily
on the FCC's Computer II decision, which exempted enhanced services
from statutory nondiscrimination requirements."' Since audiotex fell
into the enhanced classification, the carriers were not obligated to offer
the service to all potential customers.
104. 802 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting proposed amendment to Dial-It tariff
proposal).
105. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
106. Id.
107. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982).
108. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
109. 827 F.2d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1987).
110. Id. at 1297.
Il1. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 7, at paras. 114-18.
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The holdings of Southern Bell and Mountain States are especially
significant because they were not confined to the specific issue of dial-a-
porn. Neither case upheld the action of the carrier on the grounds that
the content was offensive or harmful. Instead, the actions were permitted
to stand because neither the first amendment nor the state and federal
common carrier statutes were found to bar the actions of the telephone
companies. In fact, the Ninth Circuit stated that Mountain States' moti-
vation for excluding certain audiotex providers was "immaterial." '12
The holdings in Mountain States and Southern Bell apparently con-
ferred to local telephone carriers editorial rights not traditionally associ-
ated with the telephone system. It is noteworthy that this result was not
reached through the normal public policymaking process. The courts
relied on an FCC policy that, though otherwise thorough and well-rea-
soned, did not specifically consider the issue of whether local exchange
carriers should make editorial decisions.
In fact, there is much to suggest that the holdings of these cases are
at odds with the electronic publishing policies. As of 1991, the Regional
Companies were still prohibited from originating content on the grounds
that they controlled information bottlenecks."1 3 Judge Greene's decisions
in the divestiture and line-of-business cases have consistently rejected the
notion that the local exchanges should exercise control over content., 4
C. In the Aftermath of Carlin I and II: Editorial Control for Local
Exchanges?
Although Congress failed to enact any of the comprehensive bills it
considered in the early 1980s, a clear sense also emerged that the separa-
tion of content and carriage should be maintained at the local exchange
level. 11 5 Consequently, questions can be raised about the holdings of
Southern Bell and Mountain States and their place in the structure of
telephonic mass communication, as the decision to allow local exchanges
to exercise a degree of editorial control did not result from a broad exam-
ination of communication policy.
It is quite possible that the decisions turned out as they did precisely
because of the nature of the content in question. While the decisions
seem to have granted the carriers a broad right to refuse service on the
basis of content, it is certainly possible that the courts acted as they did
out of a revulsion for dial-a-porn. Judge Sneed, for example, may have
112. Mountain States, 827 F.2d at 1297.
113. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 600-02 (D.D.C. 1987).
114. E.g., id.; United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90 (D.D.C.
1982).
115. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
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tipped his hand in the opening paragraph of Mountain States when he
wrote, "Modem telephonic technology permits the pervasive transmis-
sion of vast quantities of information, as well as Shakespeare, Shaw, and
smut. The essential question before us is whether a regional telephone
company, despite its public utility status, may refuse to carry smut on its
dial-a-message network."'1
16
Given the manner in which the "essential question" was framed, it
is not surprising that Judge Sneed issued an opinion that the company
should not be required to carry "smut." Yet, this decision did not turn
on a finding of offensiveness or illegality. Instead, the court upheld the
right of the utility to refuse service to any message provider for any rea-
son.II 7 It is interesting to speculate whether the same result would have
been reached if the company had denied the service because of a political
disagreement or a business rivalry."1 '
In addition to fueling the discussion of broader communication is-
sues, the Southern Bell and Mountain States decisions were immediately
relevant to the control of dial-a-porn. The telephone companies' argu-
ments that they were powerless to act were significantly diminished after
these decisions. Consequently, the focus in the dial-a-porn controversy
began to shift toward the actions of the carriers.
In the wake of Mountain States, Mountain Bell began eliminating
live and recorded sexually-explicit lines from its system."1 9 Some carriers
have followed suit, while others have stopped short of expelling adult
services, but have ceased to provide billing services.12° Although he had
previously ruled that the billing of the Regional Companies could not be
"discriminatory in any way," 121 Judge Greene upheld Bell Atlantic's pol-
icy of denying billing and collection services only to providers of adult
messages. 122
116. Carlin Comm. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1292 (9th Cir.
1987).
117. Id. at 1297.
118. There are indications that dial-a-porn is not the only kind of audiotex content that
might run afoul of telephone company policy. At least two companies, Southwestern Bell and
Illinois Bell, currently refuse to provide billing services for audiotex services that are deceptive,
racist, sexist, or "otherwise objectionable." Stroud, supra note 88, at Cl, col. 3.
119. Lannon, supra note 92, at p. 10.
120. E.g., Amparano, U.S. West to Ban 'Dial-a-Porn' Services On Its Network; Other Bells
May Follow, Wall St. J., May 31, 1988, at 2, col. 2; Block That Call, supra note 80; Mason &
Wilson, supra note 91.
121. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 690 F. Supp. 22, 26 (D.D.C. 1988).
122. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1989-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,710 (D.D.C. 1989).
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D. California Public Utilities Commission's Proposal: A Workable
Solution?
The ability of carriers to eliminate undesirable services is complex,
involving constitutional rights, state law, and the actions of regulatory
agencies. These difficulties are illustrated by the efforts of Pacific Bell
regarding dial-a-porn. Despite the existence of a number of revenue-gen-
erating services in California, Pacific Bell embarked on a course intended
to eliminate sexually-explicit services in order to protect its corporate
reputation. 23 However, the California Public Utilities Commission
(CPUC) ruled that such a content-based action would violate the first
amendment. 124 While seeking a court decision supporting its efforts, Pa-
cific Bell proposed an interim plan to segregate the objectionable services.
This proposal was accepted, with modifications, by the CPUC in 1989.125
Under these guidelines, general audiotex services would use prefix
844, while live chat lines would be placed on prefix 505 and services de-
fined as "harmful" would be assigned to prefix 303.126 Blocking would
be available for all three prefixes and the 303 prefix would be accessible
only to those who presubscribe. Further safeguards were enacted to pre-
vent the creation of large bills for audiotex service. 27 Whether or not
this policy survives judicial review, it does stand as an example of a com-
promise that might satisfy both sides of the controversy. It is certainly a
more workable solution to the problem than the flat ban enacted by Con-
gress in 1988.
This solution also says something about the role of the telephone
companies. Pacific Bell's stated intention was to " 'disconnect dial-a-
porn.' 28 Instead, the company was required to develop a policy that
allowed those services to remain on its system, albeit on a different foot-
ing than other audiotex services. State laws and regulations restricted
the telephone companies' ability to make an editorial decision that would
have been routine in another medium.
Perhaps more significantly, Pacific Bell's effort points out the inter-
action between a private company and state government in the setting of
policy for the telephone system. The California policy was produced by
123. Wilson, Pacific Bell Mounts New Attack on Porn, TELEPHONY, Mar. 7, 1988, at 3.
124. Sable Comm., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., No. CV84-469 AWT, 1987 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13421 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).
125. In re Application of Pacific Bell for Auth. to Establish a Tariff Schedule for Informa-
tion Calling Servs., 31 C.P.U.C.2d 401, 1989 Cal. PUC LEXIS 193 (1989), (LEXIS, Cal Li-
brary, Capuc file) (this was an abstract in 31 C.P.U.C.2d 401; only available on LEXIS).
126. 1989 Cal. PUC LEXIS 193, at 7-10.
127. Id. at 12-13.
128. Pac Bell Revamps Controversial Dial-it Services, TELEPHONY, Mar. 27, 1989, at 13
(quoting a Pacific Bell spokesman).
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both Pacific Bell and the CPUC. The distinction, or lack of it, between
public and private action is a critical one in first amendment law.
V
State and Private Action
The legal authority of the local exchange to restrict or eliminate un-
desirable content has not yet been fully defined. The results of the two
lines of Carlin cases suggest that the companies may be more successful
in restricting dial-a-porn (or other kinds of material) than the govern-
ment. However, the close relationship between the private telephone sys-
tem and the government raises significant questions about the distinction
between state action and private action.
This distinction is important in mass communication law. Since the
first amendment imposes a restriction on government activity, it does not
interfere with the rights of media organizations to make editorial deci-
sions. As a result, print or electronic media outlets may.routinely reject
objectionable or inappropriate material without prompting the first
amendment debates likely to ensue if a government agency attempted to
impose such restrictions.
The state-private distinction is considerably less clear in the tele-
phone medium than in the traditional mass media. As the Pacific Bell
example suggests, it is difficult for a public utility to enact a policy with-
out first gaining approval from the state regulatory agency. In the pro-
cess, the proposed action of the telephone company will be judged
according to the constitution, statutes, and administrative policies of the
state.
Consequently, the final result is likely to be a combination of private
and state action. For example, the decision to treat "harmful" audiotex
messages differently was enacted in the form of an approval by the
CPUC of a tariff submitted by Pacific Bell.' 29 In fact, the approved tariff
differed slightly from the one initially submitted by the company because
of modifications suggested by the Commission.1 30
Under existing law, this process of regulation does not necessarily
confer the status of state action upon such a policy. The Supreme Court
has ruled that "extensive regulation by the government does not trans-
form the actions of the regulated entity into those of the government."'1 3'
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, the Court determined that the action
129. In re Application of Pacific Bell for Auth. to Establish a Tariff Schedule for Informa-
tion Calling Servs., 31 C.P.U.C.2d 401, (1989).
130. Schultz, Pac Bell Closes in on Nixing Dial-a-Porn, TELEPHONY, Mar. 6, 1989, at 13.
131. San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 544
(1987).
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of a private utility would be considered state action only if there is "a
sufficiently close nexus between the [s]tate and the challenged action of
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated
as that of the [s]tate itself." 132 There are two general circumstances in
which such a "close nexus" might be found.
The first involves the possibility of coercion. The Supreme Court
has held that a government agency "normally can be held responsible for
a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has pro-
vided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the
choice must in law be deemed to be that of the [agency]." '133 Suggestions
of such a role have surfaced in several of the key cases involving dial-a-
porn.
In Mountain States, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the company's pol-
icy of refusing service to adult message providers was private action. 134
That case was complicated, however, by a finding that Carlin's service
had initially been terminated after a deputy county attorney, in a letter to
Mountain Bell, threatened to prosecute the company under a state stat-
ute prohibiting the dissemination of sexual material to minors. Less than
two weeks after receiving this letter, Mountain Bell announced a change
in policy, under which it would no longer carry such services. 135 The
court determined that, due to the action of the county official, state ac-
tion did exist in the original termination of Carlin's service., 36 On the
other hand, Mountain Bell's subsequent policy revision was held to be
voluntary and, therefore, a private action. 137
Similarly, there was a suggestion of "overt or covert" encourage-
ment in the Southern Bell case, although the court again declined to find
state action present. At least two Florida Public Service Commissioners
expressed reservations about Southern Bell's proposed tariff for audiotex
service during a prehearing conference. The commissioners were con-
cerned that the service could be used for "'High Society' type
messages."' 13 The original audiotex proposal was subsequently amended
to prohibit such messages. 139 During the meeting at which the tariff was
approved, the commissioners again stated their concerns about the en-
132. Jackson, 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
133. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982).
134. Carlin Comm. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th Cir.
1987).
135. Id. at 1293.
136. Id. at 1295-97.
137. Id. at 1297.
138. Carlin Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1357 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
139. Id. at 1359.
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forceability of the new provision, and questioned company officials about
the methods to be used in reviewing material." 4
A similar situation occurred in Texas, where a provider offered live
conversations on a service originally intended for prerecorded pro-
grams. 141 A staff attorney in the Texas Public Utilities Commission told
Southwestern Bell to disconnect the service. 142 According to the state
court, the subsequent disconnection could not be attributed to the action
of the state, since only the full Commission could have required the com-
pany to drop the service.1 43
In each of these cases, the company "voluntarily" enacted policies
knowing that they conformed to actions desired by state officials. It is
impossible to know all the ways in which a regulatory agency's wishes
might be transmitted to a utility, but surely commissioners and other
officials are capable of making their views known. The arguments
presented in Southern Bell and Mountain States indicate that a finding of
state action by virtue of coercion is a matter of judgment and that, at
least regarding dial-a-porn, the courts may be reluctant to rule that coer-
cion was present.
A second circumstance in which state action might be found in-
volves the public function test. According to the Supreme Court, state
action may be present when the private entity performs functions that
have been "'traditionally the exclusive prerogative'" of government. 14
One dilemma presented by this test in regard to the control of audiotex
content is that it requires an assessment of the company's motives. In
Carlin Communications v. South Central Bell (SCB), for example, a state
court found the company's policy of refusing access to an adult audiotex
service to be state action.' 45 This action was distinguished from that
present in Jackson:
In Jackson, the utility company cut off plaintiff's electricity to serve its
own private economic interest. By contrast, SCB censored Carlin's
phone messages to protect the public interest. The stated purpose of the
tariff's prohibition of sexually explicit messages is to prevent minors
from gaining access to such material. The protection of minors from
exposure to obscenity is a state concern. Thus, SCB is exercising a
state function. 1
46
140. Id. at 1359-60.
141. Omniphone v. Southwestern Bell Tel., 742 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
142. Id. at 524-25.
143. Id. at 526.
144. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982) (emphasis in original) (quoting
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1982)).
145. Carlin Comm. v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 461 So. 2d 1208 (La. Ct. App. 1984).
146. Id. at 1212 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Consequently, the policy was struck down as a violation of Carlin's
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.
The result reached in SCB is atypical, however. In Southern Bell,
the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Carlin's contention that the company was
exercising a public function. Instead, the court determined that "South-
ern Bell was motivated by a desire to protect its own corporate image," a
decidedly private function.' 47 Furthermore, the court emphasized the
fact that Jackson defined the public function as one exclusively performed
by the state:
While "public" censorship may be a function traditionally performed
by the state, it is clear that restriction of message content by a private
company based on a determination that it does not wish to do business
with another company is not a traditional state function, much less one
exclusively reserved to the state. A private business is free to choose
the content of messages with which its name and. reputation will be
associated and such a choice is not the exercise of a public function.' 48
Similarly, the Maryland Public Service Commission dismissed a
claim by adult audiotex providers against Chesapeake and Potomac that
selectively denied access to generally available billing and computer serv-
ices. '49 Since there had been a "public outcry" over dial-a-porn, the
Commission reasoned that Chesapeake and Potomac acted to "maintain
the good will of its customers . . .and [to] protect its own corporate
image." 5 °
Perhaps the broadest rejection of the public function argument came
in Mountain States. According to the Ninth Circuit, the company's
motivations were "immaterial."'' Furthermore, the court concluded
that the kind of content control at issue could not be considered a state
function. In any event, officials of telephone companies wishing to cur-
tail adult dial-a-porn service have consistently stated their arguments in
terms of protecting their corporate images. It is, of course, entirely possi-
ble that this has been their primary motivation. After all, the companies
controlling the local exchanges entered into a variety of competitive mar-
kets and certainly desires to reduce the negative publicity attending dial-
a-porn.
On the other hand, a reading of the denial of access cases would
surely encourage a company to state its position in terms calculated to
147. Carlin Comm. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1361 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
148. Id. (citation omitted).
149. In re Complaint of Sapphire Comm., 79 Md. P.S.C. 353, 1988 Md. PSC LEXIS 125
(Oct. 1988) (LEXIS, MD Library, MDPUC file) (79 Md. P.S.C. 353 was unavailable; used
1988 Md. PSC LEXIS 125).
150. 1988 Md. PSC LEXIS 125, at-ll.
151. Carlin Comm. v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 827 F.2d 1291, 1297 (9th Cir.
1987).
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avoid a finding of state action under the public function test. Absent
clear evidence to the contrary, it would be difficult for a court to con-
clude that a company's motivations were different from those publicly
expressed.
It is important to note that none of the audiotex access cases turned
on a finding that the material in question was harmful, obscene, or other-
wise illegal. Instead, each of these cases focused on the ability of a pri-
vate company to choose its business partners. As such, these are not
really "indecency" cases in the manner of Sable or Carlin III. Instead,
they are cases affirming, at least in certain jurisdictions, the right of a
telephone company to deny access to audiotex providers. The holdings
of Southern Bell and Mountain States are not limited to instances of sexu-
ally explicit material.
The extent to which private companies can restrict audiotex services
on the basis of content is still subject to the variations in state common
carrier law. However, the general thrust of the audiotex access cases is
that the first amendment does not guarantee access to the telephone sys-
tem by providers of mass communication services.
VI
The Concept of Common Carriage
The concept of common carriage is important in the development of
a first amendment model for telephonic mass communication. The tradi-
tion of common carriage distinguishes the telephone system from other
media. To a large extent, the emerging law of free expression for teleph-
ony will be determined by the ways in which first amendment law and
common carrier law are reconciled.
It is useful, therefore, to consider whether the underlying theory of
common carrier law is undergoing a fundamental change. Southern Bell
and Mountain States, building on the foundation laid by Computer II,
can be read as indications that the telephone companies may no longer be
confined to the role of neutral carrier. Indeed, those cases appeared to
confer on the telephone exchanges a right of editorial control compara-
ble, at least in certain circumstances, to that enjoyed by the mass media.
Yet, this is too sweeping a conclusion to base on a handful of early court
cases. In fact, it is possible to interpret the overall course of common
carrier policy in the 1980s as reinforcing many of the basic common car-
rier concepts.
In Computer II, the FCC allowed predivestiture AT&T to establish
a subsidiary for the provision of enhanced services:' 52 While such a com-
152. Computer II Final Decision, supra note 6, at para. 228.
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pany was not bound by the traditional nondiscrimination requirement, it
was required to abide by a series of guidelines. The subsidiary, for exam-
ple, was required to obtain all of the basic services it used under tariff,
thus assuring its access to the basic network on the same terms as its
potential competitors.1 53 Furthermore, AT&T was also instructed to
publicly disclose information on network design and management.1 54
These requirements were enacted to assure all potential users that the
telecommunications system would be able to operate on a competitive
basis. Accordingly, it can be argued that the essential precepts of com-
mon carriage were maintained in Computer II, despite the fact that the
policy led to circumstances under which the carriers were able to deny
service on the basis of content.
It must again be recognized that content issues were not under seri-
ous consideration in Computer II Instead, the Commission was seeking
a way to allow carriers to price certain services on a competitive basis.155
The additional safeguards enacted at the time clearly indicate that the
Commission was not trying to allow the carriers to exercise undue con-
trol over the use of the system.
After the AT&T divestiture went into effect, the Commission under-
took yet another major inquiry into telecommunications services. Under
the policies adopted in Computer III,156 the requirement that Regional
Companies must offer enhanced services only through a separate subsidi-
ary was removed. 1" The local exchanges controlled by the Regional
Companies would be permitted to integrate their enhanced service offer-
ings with the operation of the basic network. Ideally, this would provide
incentives to the exchange carriers to upgrade their systems. 5 8
In order to protect the interests of competitive service providers, the
Commission required local exchanges to provide basic services under the
principle of Open Network Architecture (ONA).'59 Each of the Re-
gional Companies was required to submit a plan under which it would
break the operation of the network into its most basic elements."0 Each
of these elements would then be made available on an equal and unbun-
dled basis to all service providers. Ideally, ONA would allow all provid-
ers to gain use of the telephone network on equally favorable terms.
153. Id. paras. 233-46.
154. Id. paras. 247-50.
155. Id. para. 282.
156. In re Amendment of § 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regs. (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) [hereinafter Computer III Order].
157. Id. paras. 5-8, 98-99.
158. Id. paras. 95-97.
159. Id. paras. 111-16.
160. Id. para. 114.
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ONA would exist only after a technological and. economic restruc-
turing of the system. In the meantime, the Regional Companies would
still be permitted to provide enhanced services on an unseparated basis if
competitive providers were offered the same access on equal terms. 6 '
One key difference between this concept, known as Comparably Efficient
Interconnection (CEI), and ONA is that CEI applied only to the kinds of
services provided by the local exchange carrier.'62 ONA, on the other
hand, would apply to all enhanced services, whether or not such services
were offered by the carrier.163
Each of the Regional Companies took advantage of the opportuni-
ties presented by Computer III by eliminating their separate subsidiaries
and implementing CEI policies.' These companies were also in various
stages of planning for ONA when, in June 1990, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit overruled Computer 111.165 The court deter-
mined that the FCC did not offer adequate justification for eliminating
the separate subsidiary requirement.' 66 Furthermore, the court ruled
that the FCC infringed on the authority of state regulators by involving
itself in rate regulation for enhanced services.' 67 While this action casts a
shadow on the future of ONA as a guiding principle, it is still useful to
consider Computer III as part of the continuing effort to reform and
restructure telecommunications policy. In many respects, telecommuni-
cations policy in recent decades has been focused on an attempt to sepa-
rate the regulated and the competitive components of the system. Even
before divestiture, policies were enacted that removed the equipment
manufacturing and long-distance segments from the integrated Bell Sys-
tem and placed them in a competitive environment. Only local service
remained under the control of a regulated monopoly.
Computer II can be viewed as an effort to further divide local service
into basic and enhanced components. Basic services, still considered to
be a natural monopoly, were regulated under the traditional common
carrier structure, while enhanced services were permitted to be offered in
a competitive market. Computer III took this process slightly further by
161. Id. paras. 5-6.
162. Id. para. 112. While the Regional Companies were permitted to provide enhanced
services, they were still bound by the provisions of the AT&T consent decree. Consequently,
they were not permitted to provide those enhanced services that could be classified as informa-
tion services.
163. Id. paras. 113-15.
164. Mason, FCC Takes Initiatives on Computer III, TELEPHONY, July 30, 1990, at 10.
165. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990).
166. Id. at 1231-39.
167. Id. at 1239-45.
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dividing basic service into a set of building blocks that could be utilized
selectively for service providers.
As in Computer II, the local exchange carriers of the Regional Com-
panies were required to use all basic services under. tariff and to manage
the system in such a way that those services would be available to com-
petitors on a "functionally equal" basis. 68 While these new policies were
designed to enable the carriers to function in competitive markets, they
were not intended to allow basic telecommunications system operators to
obtain advantages over their competitors.
This thread also runs through the issues and decisions raised in the
Bell System divestiture. The consent decree established line-of-business
restrictions that were clearly intended to prevent the Operating Compa-
nies from using their local exchanges to gain an unfair advantage over
competitors in information services, as well as those in equipment manu-
facture and long distance service.' 69
This rationale was followed all the way through the 1987 decision
reaffirming the line-of-business restrictions. 71 Since the local exchanges
still controlled a bottleneck, Judge Greene determined that it was neces-
sary to retain restrictions on content control. "Control by one entity of
both the content of information and the means for its transmission...
would enable it to disadvantage and to discriminate against rival elec-
tronic information providers and thus to pose a substantial threat to the
first amendment diversity principle."' 7 1 Consequently, when the Operat-
ing Companies were permitted to enter the information services field as
gateway providers, they were specifically ordered not to "discriminate
between and among providers of information."''
72
A similar approach was discussed in Congress. Although no final
action was taken, the direction of the debate clearly indicated that Con-
gress favored a policy of separation of content and conduit, at least for
local exchange carriers. In addition, when dealing with the dial-a-porn
controversy, Congress consistently sought to restrict such services by di-
rect government action rather than by amending the Communications
Act to grant carriers the authority to regulate content. However, Con-
gress has yet to take any action that fundamentally alters the common
carriage requirements of local exchange services.
While the regulatory rules have been changed by administrative and
judicial actions, the essential notion of the common carrier remains. In
168. Computer III Order, supra note 154, paras. 3-8.
169. United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 186-90 (D.D.C. 1982).
170. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
171. Id. at 586.
172. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 714 F. Supp. 1, 70 (D.D.C. 1988).
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the overall picture, the dial-a-porn access cases appear to be the excep-
tions. Allowing the exchange companies to take care of "censorship"
might prove to be a legally and politically acceptable solution to the
problem in the short run. It remains unanswered, however, whether
these precedents could also be used to restrict other types of content.
VII
Conclusion
The dial-a-porn issue contains many of the hallmarks of content reg-
ulation issues in mass communication. Once again, a balance must be
struck between the power of government to regulate offensive material
and the first amendment rights of individuals to send or receive it. In the
telephone medium, government regulation may occur at either the state
or federal level. As such, the development of policy is influenced by state
and federal statutes, administrative regulations, and constitutions, as well
as by political factors.
The issue is further complicated by uncertainty over the role of the
private media operators, in this case the local telephone exchanges.
While many controversies over media content are diffused somewhat by
industry standards and practices, the traditions of the telephone industry
seem to preclude such self-regulation.
The model that emerged from the electronic publishing proceedings
was centered on a system of local exchanges, each one providing the con-
duit to information providers on equal terms and without regard to con-
tent. This model appeared to be a product of a virtual political
consensus, as Congress, the FCC, and the courts all weighed in the issue
of content-conduit separation.
Yet this consensus may have broken down on the single issue of
dial-a-porn. As attempts by government agencies to restrict this form of
communication were frustrated on first amendment grounds, the carriers
themselves emerged as the entities best able to exert control.
The dial-a-porn issue can be viewed as an exception, involving a sin-
gle unpopular service that had been thrust into the political limelight.
However, policy does not emerge only from the careful consideration of
broad issues. More often it evolves from decisions made on specific mat-
ters. Controversies such as dial-a-porn might offer as many clues about
the developing structure of telecommunications in the age of convergence
as will more general discussions in other forums.
It is also possible that this issue has served to call attention to the
subject of editorial control by the carriers at a relatively early stage in the
history of telephonic mass communication. As additional mass media
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services come to be offered through the telephone network, the policies
ultimately enacted as a result of this controversy may well have a major
impact on the shaping of a first amendment model for telephony.
